We examine stock price responses to announcements of bank loans in China's rapidly evolving economy, in which banks in general are unable to provide the certification role as 'insiders' to mitigate information asymmetry. Previous researchers find positive stock price reactions when U.S. borrowers obtain bank loans. However, we find significantly negative bank loan announcement effects for Chinese firms, particularly when the loan is intended to repay existing debt or originates with a local bank branch. Furthermore, this negative effect is typically associated with borrowers who display more frequent related party transactions or subsequent poor corporate performance. Our evidence highlights the limited alternatives for raising capital in China and the political goals that the Chinese banking system serves.
Introduction
In supplying capital to firms, financial markets feature institutions and practices intended to mitigate problems such as transactions costs, information asymmetries, and agency conflicts, and to adapt to the regulatory environment. Much research focuses on the purposes that banks serve. Banks can intermediate the maturity preferences of lenders and borrowers (Diamond and Dybvig 1983, Rajan 1996) . As a form of "inside" debt, bank loans may solve information and agency problems that public bond issues or other "outside" debt cannot (Fama 1985 , Rajan 1992 .
If, for example, managers cannot perfectly communicate their information to capital market participants (Myers and Majluf 1984) , banks may serve a very important intermediating role between savers and borrowers.
The notion that banks are special because they produce information about borrowers has motivated some interesting empirical tests. If firms can choose between bank debt and public debt, and if banks can mitigate an information problem, raising money with a bank loan, instead of a public issue of bonds or other securities, should be a strongly positive signal, particularly for newer, smaller, or otherwise information-poor borrowers. Consistent with the information role of bank debt, while stock market responses to announcements of a bond issue are typically zero or slightly negative (see, for example, Eckbo 1986), announcements of bank loans typically yield significantly positive abnormal return for the borrower's stock (see, for example, Mikkelson and Partch 1986 and James 1987) . Furthermore, this effect appears stronger for high quality lenders (Billet, Flannery, and Garfinkel 1995) , loan renewals (Lummer and McConnell 1989, Best and Zhang 1993) , smaller borrowers (Sloven, Johnson, and Glascock 1992) , and borrowers with high dispersion in expected earnings or negative earnings realizations (Best and Zhang 1993) . Harvey, Lins, and Roper (2004) find positive abnormal returns for emerging-market borrowers who obtain internationally-syndicated term loans, with most prominent effects for subsequent, rather than first, loans and for firms with certain governance characteristics. 1 These results suggest that banks do indeed serve to generate information as suggested by "inside debt" theories of banking and bank loans. Approval of a bank loan is perceived by the stock market as a good signal, particularly for information-poor borrowers. Renewals or subsequent loan approvals may compound this effect. On the other hand, negative abnormal stock returns and poor operating performance are often observed for a few years after the announcement of a bank loan (Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel 2006) .
Economists, policy-makers, business managers, and investors continue to follow with great interest the rapid evolution of China's economic and financial system starting with the ascension of Deng Xiaoping as the country's leader in 1978. Under "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics", demand for banking services has skyrocketed, but the banking system is troubled. Chinese banking is dominated by state-owned banks, operates in an uncompetitive environment, and faces much pressure to contribute to political and social stability.
2 Perhaps as a consequence, Chinese banks continue to be plagued with substantial amounts of nonperforming loans. 3 The web page of the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission 4 reports a total of 1.3 trillion yuan (about 165 billion U.S. dollars, or 8.61% of total loans) of nonperforming loans on the books of commercial banks at the end of 2005. Other estimates of the problem are even larger. Asset management companies formed by the Chinese government have 1 They also report positive abnormal returns for international bond issues, echoing Kim and Stulz (1988) . 2 See Dinc (2005) for a study of political influences on banks in developing countries.
3 Podpiera (2006) reports that the ratios of non-performing loans (NPLs) to total loans for the four major state banks are 25. 6%, 20.1%, and 15.6% in 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively. 4 http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/mod_en00/jsp/en001000.jsp liquidated substantial volumes of bank assets at heavy discounts. Poorly-performing state-owned enterprises are the heaviest borrowers.
5
More generally, the poor state of law, regulation, and disclosure in China's capital market is a severe constraint on the efficiency of banks and their borrowers. 6 Recent research has shown that Chinese listed companies are subject to mismanagement and outright theft in the form of "tunneling" by controlling shareholders. 7 At the same time, the poor state of the capital market makes it difficult for firms to raise money with securities issues (Allen, Qian, and Qian 2005) as the stock market is relatively small and corporate bond issues are almost unheard of. Therefore, Chinese firms largely rely on retained earnings and bank loans to finance their activities.
Therefore, China offers a unique setting in which to develop further evidence on whether banks are "different", especially in a system that banks are hardly able to provide certification role as 'insiders'. We seek to learn more about how banks function in an environment that combines rapid economic growth with very underdeveloped capital markets. Our findings are of interest to a variety of academics, policy-makers, and practitioners, and contribute to problems ranging from improving banking law and regulation to pricing bank stock issues such as the recent large bank IPOs from China.
In this paper, we employ the event study method to examine stock price reaction to bank loan announcements and analyze the cross-sectional difference in the loan announcement effect.
We also examine long term performance following loan announcements as well as lenders' stock price reaction. A brief summary of our findings is as follows. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents testable hypotheses based on both the existing literature and the peculiarities of China's banking system. Section 3 describes the data we have gathered and the sample selection criteria employed. Section 4 presents empirical results, while Section 5 is a summary and agenda for future research.
Testable hypotheses
We organize our results around several testable hypotheses inspired by the mainstream banking literature or the specific characteristics of the Chinese capital market. We also set up an alternative set of testable hypotheses given the unique political and economic setting of the Chinese banking system.
We begin with the standard prediction from the mainstream bank loan announcement literature:
H1a: Announcement of a bank loan is associated with a positive abnormal return on the borrower's stock.
As explained previously, H1a implies that receipt of a bank loan is a positive signal that yields a positive return on the borrower's stock because the bank loan is "inside" debt that overcomes information asymmetry between the borrower's managers and sources of finance. Alternatively, the bank loan may convey negative information in the context of China's banking system:
H1b: Announcement of a bank loan is associated with a negative abnormal return on the borrower's stock.
The poorly developed state of China's capital market and related institutions largely restricts corporations to retained earnings and bank loans as sources of finance. Therefore, the need to obtain a bank loan can signal that a firm performs poorly, is short of cash, and, therefore, must turn to the banking system to raise money for new investments or even to pay down existing liabilities. Thus, the announcement of a bank loan elicits a negative response by the borrower's stock price.
Aside from predictions about the sign of the bank loan announcement effect, we can make more specific predictions about the size of the announcement and borrower characteristics:
H2a: The borrower's bank loan announcement return is particularly positive for firms that are information-poor, in legal or regulatory trouble, weakly governed, have greater financial and operating risk, poorer operating performance, or frequent related party transactions.
If the positive signal hypothesis for bank loan announcements, H1a, is valid, the positive effect of a bank loan announcement should be particularly pronounced for borrowers that are difficult to evaluate or seem troubled in other respects. Indicators of problematic firms include book income and balance sheet measures, indicators of audit or regulatory scrutiny, large ownership by the state, large divergence between ownership and control rights, and potentially abusive related party transactions. If a firm that scores poorly on these measures is nonetheless able to obtain a bank loan, it is a particularly strong positive signal.
Alternatively, a bank loan to a weak firm may merely confirm the impression, H1b, that the borrower is a bad firm being bailed out to support employment or other political goals:
H2b: The borrower's bank loan announcement return is particularly negative for firms that are information-poor, in legal or regulatory trouble, weakly governed, have greater financial and operating risk, poorer operating performance, or frequent related party transactions.
Put another way, the need for a bank loan confirms that the borrower is a "zombie" firm in need of a transfusion from the banking system.
We can describe similar competing hypotheses that predict firm performance depending on whether we invoke the "positive signal" or "zombie borrower" hypotheses:
H3a: The announcement of a bank loan and size of the borrower's stock return response are positively correlated with subsequent corporate performance. Bank, and Agricultural Bank of China) were formed to replace the mono-bank system and separate commercial lending from central banking functions. Joint-equity banks are incorporated as limited companies and typically feature a state-dominated shareholding structure. City commercial banks evolved from urban credit co-operatives with business mainly in the city of location. Given strong ties to local governments, they typically obtain their deposits from local governments and corporations, and suffer high loan concentration and related party transactions. Other types of banks include policy banks, rural credit co-operatives, postal savings, and branches of foreign banks.
respectively, while other financial institutions such as policy banks and rural credit co-operatives hold the remaining assets.
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As a result of politically-oriented lending practices and the lack of repayment guarantees, In spite of these efforts, many problems remain in China's banking system. The ownership shares of foreign strategic investors are relatively small and their involvement in governance is still minimal. The banking system is still dominated by state-owned enterprises, and bank lending continues to be driven by the availability of funds, not borrower profitability.
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China's banks remain largely constrained by government intervention at different levels and subject to substantial political influence, and continue to lack sound credit-risk analysis and effective monitoring of borrowers. Dobson and Kashyap (2006) provide anecdotal evidence that government influence on bank loan decisions is still widespread despite the substantial progress of reform. As they suggest, banks in China are forced to meet contradictory goals of supporting employment and changing themselves into modern commercial banks.
A symptom of the continuing problems in China's financial system are the highly publicized cases of embezzlement of corporate funds from listed companies through "related party transactions" (also known as "connected transactions") with controlling shareholders.
Controlling shareholders extract assets or cash from a listed company to another private 15 In 2005, for example, Bank of America Corporation (BOA) and Temasek invested $3.0 billion and $2.5 billion for approximately 9 and 6 percent ownership in China Construction Bank. The deal included one seat on the board of directors and transfer of some staff. 16 See Podpiera (2006) for details.
company mostly through self-dealing transactions. Existing studies have found negative impact of related party transaction on listed companies' share value. For example, Cheung et al. (2005) find that Chinese firms with higher state ownership experience lower excess return at the announcement of related party transactions. A variation on this "tunneling" directly involves the banking system: a listed company uses bank loans to obtain funds that are subsequently transferred, via related party transactions, to its parent company or other related privately-held company. In some particularly notorious cases, the controlling shareholder subsequently sold off the heavily-indebted listed company.
Data
We first search for all credit and bank loan related announcements in the Chinese newspapers, magazines, and websites designated by the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 17 Existing regulations require listed firms to disclose any transactions worth more than 10% of the book value of equity and exceeding 10 million yuan. Thus, only relatively large loans are announced in the financial press. Our search yields a total of 509 bank loan and "credit approval" announcements by Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies between confine our sample to non banking firms, we drop three announcements made by one financial company, yielding a final sample of 267 bank loan announcements. We retain announcements of "credit approval", which are not specific loan commitments, for study as a distinct sample.
We obtain additional market and accounting data from GTI Financial Information (www.gti.cn). We collect data on related party transaction from annual reports that listed companies are required to file online.
from the "Related Party Relationships and the Business Transactions" 21 category in each annual report. In particular, we include "accounts receivables", "other accounts receivables" and "prepayments" in our analysis.
Empirical results

Summary statistics
Panel A of Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics on borrowers and loans. Panel A
indicates that borrowers are typically listed on an exchange for several years. The firm size of our sample firms is smaller than the average of all listed companies. The average total assets of sample firms is 2.1 billion Yuan (about 260 million U.S. dollars), while the median is 0.92 billion Yuan, slightly less than the mean and median of the total assets of all listed companies.
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Loans are typically very large, averaging 135 million Yuan (about 16.8 million U.S. dollars), consistent with the fact that only companies obtaining large loans are required to report. There is a moderate variation in maturity of loans, with the average maturity of 2 years. Notably, there is little variation in the interest rate on loans. The mean (median) interest rate is 5.59% (5.52%).
Chinese banks have enjoyed little flexibility in determining lending rates which is reflected in the relatively low range of rates. In recent years, the central bank has applied a floating band for the lending rate. Panel A also presents descriptive statistics for sample firms with credit approval announcements during our sample period. The average market value of tradable shares for credit 21 The three primary types of related party transactions for which CSRC requires disclosure are purchase and sale of goods and services between a listed company and a related party, asset acquisition or stock ownership transfer between a listed company and a related party, and corporate lending or guarantees for obtaining collateral loans provided by (for) a listed company for (by) a related party. From the Related Party Transactions part of each annual report, we manually collect "accounts receivables", "other accounts receivables", and "pre-payments". We use these accounting items in our analysis, because they reflect receivables (generated from the above three types of related party transactions) owed by a related party but not paid, or at risk of never being paid and thus are likely to reflect transactions related to "tunneling" activities such as embezzlement of corporate assets by related parties. 22 The mean (media) of the total assets of all stock exchange listed companies is 2.4 (1.2) billion Yuan.
approval sample firms (1.3 billion yuan) is nearly 50% larger than that for bank loan sample firms (0.88 billion yuan). In addition, the average size of credit approvals (373 million yuan) is almost triple the average size of bank loans (135 million). These differences imply that perhaps larger and stronger firms are more likely to obtain credit approvals, whose values are typically greater than bank loans.
Panel B of Table 1 There is some information on the intended use of loan proceeds. For example, 48
announcements indicate that the loan will be used for new investment projects while 42 indicate that the loan will be used to repay existing debt. Furthermore, 29 announcements are for borrowers with audit problems during the announcement year, 26 are for borrowers that have been admonished for improper behavior by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and 17 announcements are for borrowers currently under "Special Treatment" status. 23 Finally, the majority of the loan announcements (over 140) are for borrowers in manufacturing industries, while over 40 announcements are for borrowers in government regulated industries such as energy, public utilities, agriculture, aircraft, airline, coal, high-tech material, and publishing.
State banks and joint equity banks provide most of the loans in our sample.
Abnormal returns around bank loan announcements
We first examine the average abnormal stock returns (AAR) and average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of borrowers around loan announcements. We compute AAR and CAR using the market model. The estimation window for calculating the market model parameters is the event time interval [-120, -21] , with time 0 being the announcement day. AAR and CAR are tested for significance using a two-tail t-test with the null hypothesis that abnormal returns are not statistically different from zero. We also report the nonparametric sign test and Wilcoxon signed- ] CAR is -0.480%, and they are statistically significant. Thus, the typical effect of a bank loan announcement is a decrease of one-third to one-half percent in the value of the borrowing firm's equity over several days following the announcement. On the other hand, the negative announcement effect is much weaker for credit approval announcements. AAR is significantly negative only on days 2 and 3 after the announcement, and CAR is not significant for any windows. We therefore focus on the bank loan announcement for the rest of the paper.
Thus, the negative stock market reaction to bank loan announcements in China supports hypothesis H1b and contrasts with what earlier studies of other countries have found. To further characterize this negative reaction, we group our events into pairs according to firm and loan characteristics. For example, we group bank loan announcements as those intended to repay or extend an old loan, versus those intended to supply cash for operations or fund new investments.
We then conduct univariate tests to compare whether the abnormal returns are statistically different between the two groups in each pair. This suggests that the market may not favor loans to troubled "rust belt" firms.
To assess the connection between related party transactions and the strength of the negative bank loan announcement return reaction, we divide the sample into above and below median firms according to the change in accounts receivables categorized as related party transaction (scaled by total assets) from the fiscal year of the loan announcement to the following fiscal year. Table 3 shows that the negative stock return effect of loan announcement is greater for firms with above median change in related party accounts receivables (-1.02%) than for firms with below median change in related party accounts receivables (-0.15%). This suggests that the market has a negative view of loans to poorly-governed firms that are more likely to engage in transferring or 'tunneling' borrowed funds. The univariate test results also indicate that the negative stock return effect of loan announcement is greater for firms with above median listing years than (-0.69%) for firms with below median listing years (0.27%). In addition, the negative CAR is larger for loans from the Big Four state banks than for loans from other banks, (-0.75% versus -0.09%). This evidence supports hypothesis H4 which predicts that the borrower's loan announcement return is even more negative if the loan is obtained from one of the Big Four state banks. Further highlighting lender characteristics, the negative CAR is stronger for loans issued by a bank's local branch below the provincial level (-0.841%). In contrast, the average 5-day CAR for loans issued by the provincial level branches and headquarters is not significantly different from zero (0.060%) . Local branches seem to be different. Indeed, the banking system in China remains fragmented and a significant portion of loans are made through widespread local branches. 24 The objectives of local banks often differ from those of the bank's headquarters.
They often share common interests with the corresponding local government and therefore may be subject to the local officials' influence. Lastly, the negative CAR is smaller for firms that offer B or H shares. Collectively, these results suggest that the strength of the negative market reaction to bank loan announcement relates to firm and loan characteristics.
Multivariate cross-sectional analysis
Next, we conduct a cross-sectional regression analysis on the variation of stock price response to bank loan announcements. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns for a six-day event window of [-1, 4] . We select independent variables to proxy for firm, loan, and lender characteristics as follows. Firm size (log of market capitalization) captures the idea in Diamond (1991) Table 4 25 We examined other variables such as the number of employees, a dummy variable if government is the largest shareholder, a dummy variable for geographic location, earning's opacity, a dummy variable for heavily regulated firms, and the number of institutional investors in the top 10 largest shareholders. All proved insignificant, and are not reported for brevity. 26 Liu (2006) reports that U.S. banks monitor larger loans more intensely.
reports correlations among the regression variables. Some are highly correlated. For example, the maturity of a loan is highly positively correlated with borrower size. Chinese investors recognize that controlling shareholders of a particular firm may be more prone to "steal" borrowed funds. Once again, the CAR is significantly more negative for firms with larger ratio of long term investment to assets (indicator of heavy industry firm). There is also evidence that the [-1, 4] CAR is marginally larger (that is, less negative) for firms with "B" or "H" shares. Note that firms issuing such shares to overseas investors are subject to more stringent disclosure requirements. Therefore, it may be more difficult for such firms to conduct related party transactions, steal borrowed money, or suffer other governance and management problems.
Consistent with the univariate analysis in Table 3 , the dummy variable for repaying debt is significantly negative, suggesting that investors react negatively to a loan used to roll over the existing debt. For the variables reflecting lender characteristics, the dummy for state banks is negative but not significant in the multivariate analysis. The coefficient for SUB_BRANCH is, however, significantly negative in most of the regressions. This result suggests that investors view local branches as more likely to be influenced by the local government. They are more likely to engage in policy-oriented loans or loans based on political connections rather than lending based on borrower creditworthiness.
Long-run performance following bank loan announcements
Our results thus far indicate that there is typically a decline in share price following an announcement of borrowing from a bank. To examine whether this reaction is merely transient or instead predicts a long term change in firm value, we investigate long term financial performance after bank loan announcements. If a bank loan is followed by increased related party transactions, the potential for expropriation by controlling shareholders may cause a deterioration in the firm's long term performance. Therefore, we examine the change in both the original value and the industry adjusted values of the return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) around bank loan announcements. We compute the average of ROA and ROE in the year before, during, and after the announcement. We then perform significance tests on the change in mean ROA and ROE following the bank loan announcement. We first report the original values and we then report the industry adjusted values, where the median and mean ROA or ROE of industries are subtracted from the original value to account for industry variation in those financial ratios. We exclude 9 companies that were under special treatment status (ST), as their financial numbers are often biased due to possible government propping. In addition, companies with more than one announcements in a particular year are only included once for that year. The final sample size for this analysis is 191. example, the original value of ROE declined to -4.49% in the accounting year after the announcement from 5.05% in the announcement year. Over the same period, the ROE adjusted for industry average declined to -3.50% from 6.08%. The declines in ROE are statistically significant at the 5% level. ROA shows the same pattern, but with weaker statistical significance.
For ROA and ROE in the second year after the announcement, we again see that, on average, firms with bank loans continue to deteriorate. The results suggest that firms that obtain bank loans typically experience deterioration in long term financial performance. Our evidence supports hypothesis H3b and is consistent with political goals behind some of the Chinese banking system's lending activity: state banks offer loans to keep state-connected firms afloat.
As we discussed earlier, only companies with relatively large loans are required to issue announcement. In addition, if firms are aware of the negative stock price reaction to bank loan announcement, some companies may have the incentive of avoiding an announcement even if they are required to do so. To overcome any possible selection bias in our data, we conduct an additional matching sample test of whether receipt of a bank loan predicts subsequent poor long run financial performance. We examine the change in ROA and ROE for two groups of firms matched on total assets and the book value of long term loans. The first group consists of companies that do not have bank loan announcements but report increases in long-term loans for a particular accounting year during our sample period of 1999 to 2004. This indicates that they have obtained smaller loans which do not require a public announcement. We obtain 119 such firms. The second group consists of companies that do not record increases in long-term loans for any particular accounting year during our sample period. We obtain 153 such firms. Similar to Table 6 , we compute summary statistics for ROA and ROE for the accounting year before, during, and after the announcement. We also compute significance tests on the changes in means and medians of ROA and ROE across the three year periods. Table 7 reports the results, with
Panel A reporting the first matching group and Panel B reporting the second matching group.
Panel A of Table 7 shows that for companies that do not have bank loan announcements but have recorded increases in long-term loans on their balance sheet for a particular accounting year during our sample period, there are significant declines in the mean (or media) of ROA and ROE in the accounting year following the long term debt increase. In contrast, Panel B shows that for companies without increases in long-term loans on their balance sheet, there is no significant change in ROA or ROE. Once again, this result is consistent with the fact that in many cases, bank loans in China may be used to keep financially troubled firms afloat, instead of being used to fund positive NPV projects.
To further check robustness and test hypothesis H3b, we group the companies based on their [-1,4] CAR and test for the significance of changes in ROA and ROE before versus after loan announcements. Table 8 reports results for companies grouped on positive versus negative CAR, and on the highest and lowest CAR declines. Among the 152 events with negative CAR, ROA and ROE decline significantly from the year before to the year after the loan announcement.
In contrast, the changes in ROA and ROE are much weaker for the 115 events with positive CAR. Echoing those findings, significant declines in ROA and ROE are observed for firms in the lowest CAR quintile while no significant changes are observed for firms in the highest CAR quintile. Overall, the results are consistent with hypothesis H3b: the size of the borrower's stock return response is positively correlated with subsequent corporate performance.
Do bank loan announcements also affect the lender's stock price negatively?
We have established that the announcement of a bank loan by a Chinese corporate borrower is often associated with a significant decline in the borrower's stock price. If these loans signal, or even subsidize, poorly-performing firms, there should be a response somewhere else in the banking system. Therefore, following Kang and Liu (2006), we also investigate the impact of bank loan announcements on the stock returns of lenders. Unfortunately, the largest Chinese banks were not yet listed on stock markets during our sample period and we must rely on a small sample of loan events associated with smaller listed banks. We conducted an event study on 28 bank loan announcements involving lenders that were listed on the stock market at the time of the announcement. The results (unreported but available upon request) indicate no statistically significant market response for the stock price of the lending bank. This insignificant finding may be due to the very small sample size or the small size of our sample of bank loans relative to typical bank assets. The structure of the relationships between individual banks and the banking authorities may also subsidize bad loans to corporate borrowers. For example, state commercial banks have been permitted to liberally write-off bad loans against their earnings, effectively reducing their tax liability. State-owned asset management companies were set up to purchase troubled assets (mainly non-performing loans) from the "Big Four" state banks. Some bonds issued by the Ministry of Finance have been used to inject funds into state banks. Recently, the government has formalized the process of topping up bank balance sheets by establishing Central Hui Jin (Remittance) Investment Ltd. Co., whose shareholders include the central bank and other government agencies. The company has injected large amounts of foreign reserves onto the balance sheets of state commercial banks.
Summary and Conclusions
We study the effect of bank loan announcements on borrower stock price for a sample of large loans from Chinese banks to listed Chinese borrowers. In contrast to what previous authors have found for bank loans in developed countries, we find that stock values for Chinese borrowers typically decline significantly in the days following a bank loan announcement. We also find that these negative announcement effects are heightened for borrowers that use loans to repay existing debt and for loans that originate with local bank branches. Chinese corporate borrowers typically display increased related party transactions in the year following a bank loan announcement. Furthermore, borrowers experience lower long-run ROA and ROE than a group of matching firms that do not have increased bank debt over the same period.
Our results are of interest to a variety of policy makers and regulators. China's banking system is still a work-in-progress, as indicated by the associations between bank borrowing and poor corporate performance. Aside from pointing out the state of China's banking reforms, our study provides lessons for many other countries at a lower level of economic and financial development than China. Furthermore, the condition of China's banking system is of interest to both small and large potential investors in Chinese banks. For example, in 2006, Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China raised $22 billion and $11 billion respectively in initial public offerings on global stock markets. Other investors placed huge amounts of funds in these banks with large direct purchases of ownership stakes. Our results highlight the substantial risks that China's banks pose for investors. Given limited investment alternatives, China's high savings rate (40% of GDP) helps keep the country's banks afloat. However, a financial crisis or significant drop in the savings rate could easily expose the poor quality of many of the banking system's assets and precipitate bank runs.
Our results also contribute to understanding broader paradoxes in China's economy.
Given large imbalances in trade and investment, China has come under pressure from the U.S. to make the yuan a fully convertible currency valued purely by market forces. It is commonly believed that such a move by China's government will lead to appreciation of the yuan and a reduction in trade and investment imbalances. However, if controls are removed and China's citizens send their savings overseas for diversification or other purposes, it is plausible that a freely-floating yuan will decline in value, rather than appreciate. A stampede out of the yuan would be associated with massive withdrawals of funds from Chinese banks which, in turn, would impede the ability of the banks to continue subsidizing poor-performing Chinese corporations. This in turn could lead to massive unemployment and social instability as these firms collapse. Thus, our study of Chinese bank loans reminds us of the potential consequences that China's leaders face in reforming their financial and economic system. Average abnormal returns (AAR) and average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are calculated using the market model and the standard event study methodology.
The estimation window for calculating the market model parameters is the event time interval [-120, -21] . The announcement day is 0. AAR and CAR are tested for significance using a two-tail t-test with the null hypothesis that AAR (CAR) are not statistically different from zero. The sign test categorizes data into binary outcomes with null hypothesis being the percentage of negative AAR (CAR) equal to the percentage of positive AAR (CAR). The Wilcoxon signed-rank test embeds the information of magnitudes with the null hypothesis being that there is no difference in magnitudes between the negative and positive AAR (CAR). "***", "**", and "*"
indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. [-1,4 ] is the cumulative average abnormal return from one day prior to a bank loan announcement to 4 days after the announcement. RPT is the change in accounts receivables categorized as "related party transactions" (scaled by total assets) from the announcement fiscal year to the following fiscal year. MKT_CAP is the natural log of the market value of tradable shares. ROA is net earnings divided by assets. SALES_GROWTH is the growth rate of sales for the year prior to the announcement. LTINV/ASSET is long term investment divided by assets. LOAN/ASSET is size of the bank loan divided by assets. MATURITY is maturity of the loan, in years. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 1,4] ). MULTIPLE is a dummy set to 1 if the loan announcement is preceded by another from the same company within 12 months. PURPOSE_REPAY is a dummy set to 1 if intended purpose of the loan is to repay existing debt. PURPOSE_INVEST is a dummy set to 1 if the intended purpose of the loan is investment. BIG4_LENDER is a dummy set to 1 if the lender is one of the four largest state-owned banks, B_H_SHARES is a dummy set to 1 if the borrower has foreign classes of equity outstanding. POLITICAL is a dummy set to 1 if a board director of the borrower has ever worked in a government agency. DISTRESSED is a dummy set to 1 if regulators classified the borrower as under "special treatment". SUB_BRANCH is a dummy set to 1 if a loan is originated with a bank's local branch below the provincial level. Other explanatory variables are defined in the previous table. White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses. "***", "**", and "*" indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. This table reports the return on asset (%) (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) around bank loan announcements. ROA-1 and ROE-1 are the ROA and ROE of a company in the accounting year before the bank loan announcement, respectively. ROA 0 and ROE 0 are the ROA and ROE in the announcement year, while ROA 1 (ROA2) and ROE 1 (ROE2) are the ROA and ROE in the first (second) accounting year after the announcement. We report both original values and the industry adjusted values. In particular, the median and mean ROA or ROE of industries are subtracted from the original value to account for industry variation in financial ratios. We exclude 9 companies that were under special treatment status (ST), as their financial numbers are often biased due to possible government propping. In addition, multiple announcements in a particular year by the same company are only included once in the sample. The final sample size is 191. T-test (sign-test) is for testing the difference in mean (median) of ROA and ROE. "***", "**", and "*" indicate the test in the mean (median) difference is at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Table 7 . Accounting performance of matching companies
The table reports the changes in return on assets (%) (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) of companies in the matching group. The matching group is constructed by first selecting companies that have similar total assets to our sample companies. Then companies are grouped into two sub-samples based on their long term loans on the balance sheet. In panel A, the matching group includes companies that do not have bank loan announcements but have recorded increases in long-term loans on their balance sheet for a particular accounting year during our sample period. In panel B, the matching group includes companies that do not have increases in long-term loans in their balance sheet for any particular accounting year during our sample period. T-test (sign-test) is for testing the difference in mean (median) of ROA and ROE. "***", "**", and "*" indicate the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
